We study the proportional chore division problem where a protocol wants to divide a negatively valued object, called chore, among n different players. The goal is to find an allocation such that cost of the chore assigned to each player be at most 1/n of the total cost. This problem is the dual variant of the cake cutting problem in which we want to allocate a desirable object. Edmonds and Pruhs [6] showed that any protocol for the proportional cake cutting must use at least Ω(n log n) queries in the worst case, however, finding a lower bound for the proportional chore division remained an interesting open problem. We show that chore division and cake cutting problems are closely related to each other and provide an Ω(n log n) lower bound for chore division. We also consider the problem when players have unequal entitlements and show that any protocol for chore division and cake cutting must use an unbounded number of queries. Finally, we present a simple algorithm that allocates a chore among the players with unequal entitlements using an unbounded but finite number of queries.
for three players. Later, Banach, Knaster, and Steinhaus proposed an O(n 2 ) protocol inspired by the cut-and-choose protocol for proportional allocation among n players. Even and Paz [7] improved this result by providing an O(n log n) divide and conquer protocol. Also, they show that no protocol can proportionally allocate the cake using less than n cuts; however this lower bound was not tight. The main difficulty of obtaining any lower bound for the cake cutting was that there was no formal way to represent protocols. Finally, Robertson and Webb [14] gave a formal model for cake cutting protocols. Their model covers all discrete cake cutting protocols. Only recently, Edmonds and Pruhs [6] provided an Ω(n log n) lower bound for the cake cutting. Their result shows that the proportional protocol by Even and Paz is tight up to a constant factor.
However, finding an envy-free allocation was seemed to be much harder. For a long time, the only known discrete envy-free protocols were for n ≤ 3. Every other protocol required an unbounded number of queries [4, 12] . Alijani et al. [1] gave a bounded protocol for the envy-free allocation under different assumptions on the valuation functions. In a recent work, Procaccia [13] proved an Ω(n 2 ) lower bound for envy-free allocation which shows that finding an envy-free allocation is truly harder than proportional allocation. In a recent breakthrough, Aziz and Mackenzie [3, 2] provided the first discrete and bounded protocol for envy-free allocation. Their protocol requires n n n n n n queries in the worst case.
Despite all the studies in the cake cutting, the results known for the chore division is very limited. The same divide and conquer algorithm by Even and Paz, finds a proportional allocation using O(n log n) queries. However, no lower bound was known for this problem. For the envy-free chore division, Oskui provided a protocol for three players using at most 9 cuts. Later, Peterson and Su [11] gave an envy-free chore protocol for n players, although their protocol is unbounded. Also, a protocol by Peterson and Su [10] finds an envy-free allocation for 4 players using moving-knife procedure. However, the moving-knife procedure is not discrete and could not be captured using any discrete protocol. As of today, no discrete and bounded protocol is known for envy-free allocation of a chore among n > 3 players. Also, no lower bound was known for this problem.
In this paper, we give an Ω(n log n) lower bound for the proportional chore division. Our method shows a close relation between chore division and cake cutting. We introduce a subproblem similar to thin-rich game introduced in [6] , and show that solving both proportional cake cutting and proportional chore division requires solving this problem, and solving this problem is hard. Our method can also be seen roughly as a reduction from proportional chore division to proportional cake cutting. Since envy-freeness implies proportionality, our result shows that any envy-free chore division protocol requires at least Ω(n log n) queries.
We also study the problem when players have unequal entitlements. Formally, entitlement describes the proportion of the chore that each player expects to receive. Getting back to our example about dividing a job, suppose that we want to divide up a job among a full-time employee and a part-time employee. In this case, the full-time employee expects to receive a bigger proportion of the job. Therefore, the entitlement of this player is greater than the other player's. Some studies in fair allocation with entitlements are [14, 12, 8 ].
An interesting result by Stromquist and Woodall [16] provides an existential proof that there is an envy-free allocation of the chore such that it requires cutting the chore at most O(n log n) times even if players have unequal entitlements. Although, it does not provide any protocol for this problem. Despite this result, in this paper, we show that there is no discrete and bounded protocol for proportional chore division when players have different entitlements. Also, we represent an unbounded but finite protocol for this problem.
Preliminaries
In chore division and cake cutting problems, we are asked to partition a divisible object among n players. A chore is usually modeled by the interval [0, 1]. Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of players, each player i has a valuation function v i that indicates his valuation for each subinterval in [0, 1]. In the chore division, this value indicates the cost of each interval to player i; in this case, we may refer to this function as a cost function. In the cake cutting problem, this function represents how good an interval is for that player. For an interval [x, y], we use v i (x, y) to denote the player i's valuation for this interval. We assume that valuation functions are non-negative, additive, divisible and normalized, in other words, for each player i, his valuation function v i satisfies the following properties:
• Non-negative: v i (I) ≥ 0 for every subinterval I in [0, 1].
for all disjoint intervals I 1 and I 2 .
• Divisible: for every interval I and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, there exists an interval I ′ ⊆ I such that v i (I ′ ) = λv i (I).
• Normalized: v i (0, 1) = 1.
For an interval I = [x, y], we denote Lef t(I) = x and Right(I) = y. We say that P is a piece of the chore if it is union of finite disjoint intervals, i.e., P = ∪ k i=1 I i . For a piece P , we use |P | to denote its width which is:
Similarly, we use v(P ) to denote the value of function v for P . It follows from additivity of valuation functions that:
Also, we use D v (P ) = v(P )/|P | to denote the density of P .
The complexity of a protocol is the number of queries it makes. We use the standard Robertson and Webb query model which allows two types of queries on a valuation function v:
We say that an allocation X = (X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n ) is proportional if v i (X i ) ≤ 1/n for every player i. This definition can be generalized to the case players have unequal entitlements. Formally, we call an allocation X proportional if v i (X i ) ≤ e i for each player i where e i > 0 is his entitlement. Entitlements always add up to 1, i.e., n i=1 e i = 1.
Lower Bound on Chore Division
In this section we provide an Ω(n log n) lower bound for chore division. In the cake cutting, Edmonds and Pruhs [6] presents an Ω(n log n) lower bound by showing that finding a dense part for an arbitrary valuation function is hard and a protocol must use at least Ω(log n) queries. Later it shows that any proportional protocol for cake cutting finds a dense part for at least Ω(n) of the valuation functions. For the chore division, we consider special type of valuation functions which density of each part is at least 1/2, and we present a mapping from these valuation functions to low-density valuation functions. After that, we show that using any proportional protocol for chore division, one can find dense pieces for at least Ω(n) of n low-density valuation functions, and we complete the proof by showing that finding this piece requires at least Ω(log n) queries in the worst case.
For an arbitrary positive valuation function v, we define its inverse function and show that every query on the inverse function can be answered using O(1) queries on the v. Later, we show that the inverse function is the appropriate mapping from high-density functions to low-density functions. Definition 3.2 For a positive valuation function v, we use v −1 to denote the its inverse function and define it as follows:
v
Note that for a positive valuation function, every CUT v (x, y) has a unique answer, therefore the function above is well-defined for positive functions. 
So we can answer each query on v −1 with O(1) queries on v.
Proof. Based on definition of the inverse function, we have:
For proving the second part we must show
It is clear that v −1 −1 = v for every positive valuation function v.
We introduce high-density and low-density pieces. Edmonds and Pruhs [6] show that a protocol must use at least Ω(log n) queries in order to find a high-density piece for an arbitrary valuation function. We expand their result by showing that finding a high-density piece for a (0, 2)-dense valuation function is still hard. Definition 3.4 A piece X is heavy in respect to valuation function v if its width is at most 1/n and the valuation of v on this piece be at least 1/2n, i.e., |X| ≤ 1/n and v(X) ≥ 1/2n.
Similarly, a piece is light in respect to v if |X| ≥ 1/2n and v(X) ≤ 1/n.
Note that heavy and light pieces are not exclusive, and a piece can be both heavy and light.
Theorem 3.5 Any protocol that finds a heavy piece for an arbitrary positive (0, 2)-dense valuation function makes at least Ω(log n) queries in the worst case.
Now we are ready to prove that complexity of any proportional chore division protocol is at least Ω(n log n) Theorem 3.6 Any protocol for the proportional chore division makes at least Ω(n log n) queries in the worst case.
Proof. We show that any protocol for this problem requires Ω(n log n) queries even if all the players' valuation functions are (1/2, ∞)-dense. Specifically, we show than given n arbitrary positive (0, 2)-dense valuation functions, one can use their inverse functions and any proportional chore division protocol to find a heavy piece for at least Ω(n) of them. Consider n positive (0, 2)dense valuation functions v 1 , v 2 , · · · , v n , and solve proportional chore division problem for valuation functions v −1 1 , · · · , v −1 n . Let X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n be the allocation returned by the protocol in which X i is the piece allocated to player i. Since the protocol is proportional, the value of the piece X i for the player i is at most 1/n, i.e., v −1 i (X i ) ≤ 1/n. First we show that all the valuation functions v −1 1 , · · · , v −1 n are (1/2, ∞)-dense and later we use this observation to show that for at least n/3 players, the width of the piece which is allocated to them is at least 1/2n. 
Since v is positive and (0, 2)-dense, we have:
This implies that:
Therefore all inverse valuation functions are (1/2, ∞)-dense, now we show that in any proportional allocation of the chore at least n/3 of the players get a piece with width at least 1/2n, so their pieces are light in their perspective. Lemma 3.8 Given n players with (1/2, ∞)-dense valuation functions v ′ 1 , · · · , v ′ n , let X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n be any proportional allocation of the chore to the players, then at least n/3 of the allocated pieces are light for their owner.
Proof. For each player i, we use W i to denote the width of the piece X i , then n i=1 W i = 1. Since the valuation functions are (1/2, ∞)-dense, we have v ′ i (X i ) ≥ W i /2 for each player i, therefore W i ≤ 2/n. Now assume that w is the number of pieces with width less than 1/2n. Since the width of every other piece is at most 2/n, the following must holds:
Therefore at least n − w ≥ n/3 of the W i are at least 1/2n, and the width of at least n/3 of the X i are at least 1/2n. Note that because of the proportionality the value of each of these pieces is at most 1/n for its owner. Therefore these pieces are light.
Let X ′ be the set of light pieces returned by the protocol. According to lemma 3.8, |X ′ | ≥ n/3. for each light piece x ′ ∈ X ′ we define its inverse as follows. 
. For a part x which is union of the finite disjoint intervals I 1 , · · · , I k , we define inverse of x as
Let x ′ ∈ X ′ be a light piece, suppose that this piece is allocated to the player i. We complete the proof by showing that
Since we have shown that finding a heavy piece in a positive (0, 2)-dense valuation function requires at least Ω(log n) queries and any proportional protocol finds a heavy piece for at least n/3 of the (0, 2)-dense valuation functions, it follows that complexity of the any proportional protocol is at least Ω(n log n).
Lemma 3.10 Let x be a light piece in respect to v where v is a positive valuation function, then
v . It follows that:
This completes the proof.
Suppose that a proportional chore protocol makes T (n) queries. If we give this protocol inverse of n positive (0, 2)-dense valuation functions, according to lemma 3.3, we can still answer each query in O(1), so the protocol finds a proportional allocation for the inverse functions using O(T (n)) queries. By lemma 3.8, in the allocation returned by this protocol there are at least n/3 light pieces in respect to inverse functions. Since the protocol makes at most O(T (n)) queries, the pieces returned by this protocol are at most union of O(T (n)) intervals, so one can calculate the inverse of all these pieces using O(T (n)) queries. Lemma 3.10 shows these are at least n/3 heavy pieces among these new pieces. Therefore the protocol finds a heavy piece for at least n/3 of valuation functions using O(T (n)) queries. This along with lemma 3.5 implies that T (n) = Ω(n log n).
Chore Division with Different Entitlements
In the previous section we showed that complexity of any proportional chore division protocol for n players is Ω(n log n) and the simple divide and conquer algorithm by Even and Paz achieves this bound. In this section we consider the problem when players have unequal entitlements. Formally, let e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n be the entitlements of the players where e i is the entitlement of the player i. Recall that a proportional allocation for these players is a partition of the chore into n pieces X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n such that v i (X i ) ≤ e i for every player i where v i is his valuation function. We show that unlike the symmetric form of this problem where all the entitlements are 1/n, there is no bounded protocol that solves this problem. To this end, we show that no bounded protocol for this problem exists even for the case of two players. Note that, our approach can also be applied to the proportional cake cutting with different entitlements implying that no bounded protocol exists for this problem. Finally, we give an unbounded but finite protocol for the division of chore between players with different entitlements. Theorem 4.1 Any protocol for a two-player proportional chore allocation must make an unbounded number of queries in the worst case when players have different entitlements.
Proof. Let e 1 and e 2 be the entitlements of the players, and v 1 and v 2 be their valuation functions. We suppose that e 1 = 1/k where k > 1 is an arbitrary integer, and show that any protocol must make at least Ω(log k) queries in the worst case. This implies that any protocol requires an unbounded number of queries, since Ω(log k) can be arbitrary large.
Suppose that the first player's valuation function is a uniform function on [0, 1], i.e., v 1 (x, y) = y − x. Let X 1 , X 2 be the allocation returned by the protocol. Since the allocation is proportional we have v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ 1/k and v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ (k − 1)/k. Since v 1 is a uniform function it implies that |X 1 | = v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ 1/k, thus, |X 2 | ≥ (k − 1)/k. Note that union of the X 1 and X 2 is the whole chore, therefore v 2 (X 1 ) = 1 − v 2 (X 2 ) ≥ 1/k. Therefore the protocol finds a piece X 1 for an arbitrary valuation function v 2 such that v 2 (X 1 ) ≥ 1/k and |X 1 | ≤ 1/k. Since v 2 could be any function including positive (0, 2)-dense valuation functions, the lemma 3.5 implies that the complexity of the protocol is at least Ω(log k) in the worst case. This completes the proof. Now, we give a finite protocol for the proportional chore division when entitlements are not necessarily equal. The key observation is that if all the entitlements are the rational numbers, one can proportionally allocate the chore by cloning the players. Formally, if entitlements are rational numbers e 1 = p 1 /q, e 2 = p 2 /q, · · · , e n = p n /q, one can proportionally allocate the chore by cloning the first player p 1 times with the same valuation function v 1 , cloning the second player p 2 times and so on. After cloning the players, the entitlements of all new player are equal and we can allocate the chore using any proportional protocol for equal entitlements. The only problem is when entitlements are irrational numbers. We first solve the problem when there are two players, and later we show that how this protocol can be used to solve the problem for an arbitrary number of players.
Let e 1 and e 2 be two real numbers. Algorithm 1 partitions the chore C into two parts X 1 and X 2 such that v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ e 1 v 1 (C) and v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ e 2 v 2 (C). Without loss of generality we can assume that e 1 ≤ e 2 . First, the algorithm normalizes the valuation functions such that C costs 1 to both players. The main reason that we do not assuming that the valuation functions are normalized, is that this protocol is often used by our other protocol, and it has to divide a part of the original chore which might costs less than 1. After normalizing, the protocol must divide the chore into two parts X 1 and X 2 such that v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ e 1 and v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ e 2 . The algorithm keeps two variables Algorithm 1: Two-Player Proportional Chore Division with Entitlements Data: Entitlements e 1 and e 2 , players' valuation functions v 1 and v 2 , and a chore C. 1: Rearrange players such that e 1 ≤ e 2 . 2: Normalize the valuation functions. 3: Ask both players to place a trim on the chore such that the cost of the chore on the left of the trim be equal to e 1 . 4: if If the right trim is by the first player then
5:
Allocate the chore on the left of the first player's trim to him, and rest of the chore to second player. 6: return the allocation. 7: else 8:
Define the variable r i = e i for each player i.
9:
Let l 1 and l 2 be the place of left and right trims, respectively.
10:
Find the smallest integer k such that e 1 /k ≤ v 2 (0, l 2 ) − v 2 (0, l 1 ).
11:
Let r ′ ≥ v 2 (0, l 1 ) be the smallest number such that e 2 − r ′ is divisible by e 1 /k.
12:
l = CUT v 2 (0, r ′ ).
13:
Allocate the chore on the left of the line l to the second player, and set r 2 = r 2 − r ′ .
14:
while r 1 > 0 and r 2 > 0 do 15: Ask both players to place a trim on the remaining of the chore such that the cost of the chore on the left of the trim be equal to e 1 /k.
16:
Let i be the player who has the right trim.
17:
Cut the chore from player i trim and allocate the chore on the left to him and set r i = r i − e 1 /k.
18:
Let i be the player which r i > 0.
19:
allocate the remaining chore to player i.
20:
return the allocation. r 1 and r 2 in which r i shows how much chore one can still allocate to player i, i.e., if X ′ i be what that is already allocated to player i, then r i = e i − v i (X ′ i ). The algorithm first asks each player to place a trim on the chore such the value of the chore on the left of his trim be equal to e 1 . If the first player has the right trim, then we can allocated the chore up to his trim to this player. Since this part costs at least e 1 to the second player, the cost of the remaining chore is at most 1 − e 1 = e 2 , thus, we can allocate the rest of the chore to this player. If the trims of the players are exactly at the same position, we consider the first player to have the right trim. Otherwise, suppose that the rightmost trim is by second player, then the algorithm cuts a piece P from left side of the chore and allocate it to the second player such that v 1 (P ) ≥ e 1 , v 2 (P ) ≤ e 1 and (e 2 − v 2 (P ))/e 1 is a rational number. After that the maximum amount of the chore that we can give to second player is e 2 − v 2 (P ) and since (e 2 − v 2 (P ))/e 1 is a rational number, we can solve the problem by cloning the players.
Theorem 4.2 Let X 1 and X 2 be the allocation returned by algorithm 1, then v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ e 1 v 1 (C) and v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ e 2 v 2 (C).
Proof. W.l.o.g., assume that e 1 ≤ e 2 . After normalizing the valuation functions, a protocol must partition the chore into two parts X 1 and X 2 , such that v 1 (X 1 ) ≤ e 1 and v 2 (X 2 ) ≤ e 2 .
First, the algorithm asks both players to place a trim on the chore such that the cost of the part on the left of the trim be e 1 to them. If the first player has the right trim, then we can assign the chore up to this trim to him. This part costs at least e 1 to player 2, therefore the cost of the We prove this theorem by induction. For n = 1, we can simply allocate all the chore to the player 1. When n = 2, we use algorithm 1 to proportionally allocate the chore between two players. Therefore, the theorem holds for n ≤ 2 which are the base cases for the induction. For the Induction step suppose that the algorithm proportionally allocates the chore between n − 1 players. Considering the algorithm for n players, first it recursively allocate the chore between the first n − 1 players. Let X ′ 1 , X ′ 2 , · · · , X ′ n−1 be this allocation, by induction hypothesis, for each player i < n we have v i (X ′ i ) ≤ e i /(e 1 + e 2 + · · · + e n−1 ). After that, the algorithm reallocate each X ′ i between its current owner and player n. In reallocation of X ′ i , entitlement of the player i is 1 − e n . Therefore, the cost of what he gets is at most v i (X ′ i )(1 − e n ) ≤ e i /(e 1 + e 2 + · · · + e n−1 )(1 − e n ) = e i /(e 1 + e 2 + · · · + e n−1 )(e 1 + e 2 + · · · + e n−1 )
After reallocating all the pieces, the cost of the chore assigned to player n is at most:
Therefore the cost the part assigned to each player i is at most e i , and this completes the induction step.
Note that, using the same approach, it can be shown that the proportional cake cutting problem requires an unbounded number of queries when players have unequal entitlements. In a recent preprint Cseh and Fleiner [5] independently considered the cake cutting problem with different entitlements, and they provide a tight lower bound for this problem.
Lower Bound on Finding a Heavy Piece
In this section we prove the theorem 3.5 and give an Ω(log n) lower bound for finding a heavy piece in positive (0, 2)-dense valuation functions. We introduce special types of valuation functions, called bounded-value-trees, and present an adversarial strategy that gives an Ω(log n) lower bound for finding a heavy piece on bounded-value-trees. Bounded-value-trees are very similar to value trees valuation functions introduced in [6] , but value trees can not be used for our problem since these valuation functions are not necessarily (0, 2)-dense.
Assume that n ≥ 500 is a power of three. A bounded-value-tree is a ternary balanced tree with n leaves and depth d = log 3 n. Each non-leaf node v in the tree has three children, we use l(u), m(u) and r(u) to denote its left, middle, and right children. Each node in the tree corresponds to an interval in [0, 1]. For each node u, we use I u to denote the interval corresponds to u, and we use V (u) and D(u) to denote the value and the density of the interval I u . Let r be the root of the tree, then |I r | = 1 and V (r) = 1. For every non-leaf node u, its children partition the interval corresponding to u into three disjoint intervals with equal width, i.e., I u = I l(u) ∪ I m(u) ∪ I r(u) , |I l(u) | = |I m(u) | = |I r(u) | = |I u |/3. It follows that width of every leaf in the tree is 1/n. We call a node u critical if D(u) × β > 2 where β = 2 6/ ln(n) .
We label each edge in the tree such that the value of every node u be the product of the label of edges along the path from the root to u. For a non-leaf critical node u, the label of edges between this node and its children are 1/3 . Every other non-leaf node has an edge with the label β/3 called a heavy edge, and the label of its two other edges which we call them light are 1/2 − β/6.
We assume that valuation of every leaf in the tree is uniform, this means that for every leaf u, and an interval I ⊆ I u , we have V (I) = V (u)|I| |I u | . Therefore we can valuation of an arbitrary interval using the tree. Note that, it follows from the definition of critical nodes and our labeling that all children of a critical node are also critical.
Lemma 5.1 In a bounded-value-tree, the value of every non-leaf node is the sum of values for its children.
Proof. Consider a non-leaf node u, if node u is critical then all the edges it has are labeled 1/3, therefore V (l(u)) + V (m(u)) + V (r(u)) = (V (u)/3 + V (u)/3 + V (u)/3) = V (u). The lemma holds in this case. Otherwise, we suppose that a node u is not critical, therefore V (l(u)) + V (m(u)) + V (r(u)) = V (u)(β/3 + 1/2 − β/6 + 1/2 − β/6) = V (u). This completes the proof.
Note that, since n ≥ 500, the light edges are always greater than zero.
For a node u, we use h(u), q(u) and z(u) to denote respectively the number of heavy, light, and other edges along the path from the root to u. In the following lemma we show that how we can compute density of node u from h(u), q(u) and z(u).
Lemma 5.2
In a bounded-value-tree we have D(u) = β h(u) (3/2 − β/2) q(u) for every node u in the tree.
Proof. By the definition of the bounded-value-trees we have:
Now we are ready to show that bounded-value-trees are positive and (0, 2)-dense.
Lemma 5.3 Consider any bounded-value-tree, the valuation that this tree represents is positive and (0, 2)-dense.
Proof. Our goal is to show that density of every interval I is at most 2 and greater than 0 if |I| > 0. By the definition of the bounded-value-tree, the valuation for every interval I is greater than zero, so as its density. Now it remains to show that density of every interval is at most 2. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there is an interval with density greater than 2, it follows that there is a leaf in the tree with the density greater than 2. Let u be this leaf. Consider the case that u is a critical leaf, let u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u k be the path from the root to u where u 1 = r and u k = u. Let u i be the first node in this sequence that is critical. i is larger than one, since the root is not critical. It follows from the definition of the bounded-value-trees that D(u) = D(u i ) ≤ βD(u i−1 ). Since u i−1 is not critical, it implies that βD(u i−1 ) ≤ 2, therefore D(u) ≤ 2 which is a contradiction.
Otherwise, suppose that u is not critical, therefore D(u) < βD(u) ≤ 2, thus we have the contradiction for both cases.
We say that a non-critical leaf u in the tree is rich if D(u) ≥ 1/2. The following lemma shows that we can use any protocol that finds a heavy piece to find either a rich or a critical leaf in a bounded-value-tree. Lemma 5.4 If a protocol finds a heavy piece in positive (0, 2)-dense valuation functions with at most T (n) queries, then using O(T (n)) queries we can find either a rich or a critical leaf in a bounded-value-tree.
Proof. Consider the valuation function derived from the bounded-value-tree. Let piece P be the output of the protocol for this valuation function. Since P is heavy, we have |P | ≤ 1/n and V (P ) ≥ 1/2n. Therefore, D(P ) ≥ 1/2. Since P is the union of at most O(T (n)) intervals, there is an interval I with the density at least 1/2. One can find this interval with O(T (n)) queries. Since |I| ≤ |P | ≤ 1/n, the interval I overlaps with at most two leaves, and one of these leaves has a density at least 1/2 which can be found with O(1) queries. The density of this leaf is at least 1/2, thus it is either critical or rich.
For the rest of the section, our goal is to show that any protocol for finding a leaf which is either rich or critical must make at least Ω(log n) queries. To this end, we first show that h(u) = Ω(log n) for critical and rich leaves.
Lemma 5.5 Let u be a leaf which is either rich or critical, then h(u) > (ln n)/6 − 1.
Proof. First, we assume that u is a critical leaf, therefore βD(u) > 2 ⇒ D(u) > 2/β. It implies from lemma 5.2 that: 2/β < D(u) = β h(u) (3/2 − β/2) q(u) ≤ β h(u) .
Therefore: β h(u)+1 > 2 ⇒ h(u) > (log β 2) − 1 = (ln n)/6 − 1 .
Otherwise, suppose that u is a rich leaf, therefore D(u) ≥ 1/2. Since u is a leaf and is not a critical node, we have h(u) + q(u) = d = log 3 n. We complete the proof by showing that h(u) must be greater than (ln n)/6. For the sake of contradiction suppose that h(u) ≤ (ln n)/6, therefore the maximum density that u can have is:
β (ln n)/6 (3/2 − β/2) log 3 n−(ln n)/6 .
Let denote f (n) to be the function above.
It is easy to verify that function f is an increasing function in n. Therefore:
which is a contradiction. Thus, for this case h(u) > (ln n)/6. Now we can prove the theorem 3.5.
Proof. Suppose that a protocol wants to find a rich or critical leaf in a bounded-value-tree. We say that an edge in a tree is revealed if the protocol can find its label according to the information it has. It is shown in [6] that an adversarial strategy can answer queries for the valuation function derived from a value-tree, such that after k queries, at most 2k edges revealed to be heavy. We follow this strategy for the first ⌊((ln n)/6 − 1)/2⌋ queries. Since n ≥ 500, we have ((ln n)/6 − 1)/2 > 0. We need to make only one change in the strategy, the strategy in [6] reveals light and heavy edges to be 1/4 and 1/2 respectively, however, their strategy can easily be modified to reveal light edges to be 1/2 − β/6 and heavy edges to be β/3. After the first ⌊((ln n)/6 − 1)/2⌋ queries, at most (ln n)/6 − 1 heavy edges are revealed. By lemma 5.5, any critical or heavy leaf must has at least (ln n)/6 heavy edges in its path to the root. Therefore, the protocol could not be sure about any critical or heavy leaf. After these queries, the density of no interval is greater 2, since no node is revealed to be critical. Therefore, there is a bounded-value-tree such that its valuation function answers all the queries that protocol has made in the same way. Therefore, a protocol could not find a critical or heavy leaf with ((ln n)/6 − 1)/2 queries and this completes the proof.
